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CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling 
National Security Review Frameworks 
as a Countermeasure to Economic 
Espionage in the Age of Globalization 
By Souvik Saha* 
Abstract: The era of globalization has produced previously unimaginable 
economic benefits by spurring linkages between countries through trade and 
foreign investment.  This newfound interconnectivity, however, also raises 
national security concerns for countries, such as the United States, that welcome 
foreign investment in the form of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.  Part II 
highlights one such threat stemming from the rise of China and its aggressive 
foreign investment strategy to acquire American companies in industries critical 
to national security.  In response to the growing threat of economic espionage 
from foreign investors, the United States created the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—a national security review process for 
foreign mergers and acquisitions.  Part III analyzes the evolution of CFIUS, 
while Part IV introduces  China’s freshly minted model for analogous national 
security reviews.  Given the rise of these dueling frameworks in the world’s two 
largest economies, critics contend that such national security reviews inject non-
transparency, uncertainty, and politics into viable investment opportunities.  
Part V addresses these concerns and demonstrates that such criticisms are 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When asked whether the United States or China were perpetrators of 
industrial espionage, Julian Assange declared, “The U.S. is one of the 
victims.”1  The disclosure smacks of irony given its source, a man dedicated 
to proliferating corporate and governmental secrets in the name of freedom 
of information.  Yet, the United States’ vulnerability to espionage—military 
or economic—is hardly a secret.  While many believe that spy games are a 
relic of the Cold War, the United States, and presumably all developed 
economies, remain on high alert.  Those operating on the frontlines of 
American counter-intelligence efforts echo the sentiment: “The Cold War is 
not over, it has merely moved into a new arena: the global marketplace.”2 
Indeed, the critically acclaimed “Age of Globalization” is upon us, and 
it features rapidly developing economies linked together in a mounting 
global market.  The promise of globalization is well-documented as a force 
that is “enlarg[ing] the world economy, promot[ing] technological 
 
 1  Andy Greenberg, An Interview with WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, FORBES (Nov. 29, 
2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/an-interview-with-
wikileaks-julian-assange/. 
 2  Economic Espionage, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
  
CFIUS Now Made in China 
33:199 (2012) 
201 
innovations, foster[ing] universal political participation, and enhanc[ing] 
international cooperation.”3  Unlike the rhetoric of the Cold War, the new 
vernacular emphasizes mutual economic development rather than mutually 
assured destruction.  In the process of “integrat[ing] markets, transportation 
systems, and communication systems,” globalization renders “national 
boundaries immaterial.”4  In light of these previously unimaginable 




While the United States has benefited greatly from this global 
transformation, the remarkable and unprecedented expansion of China’s 
global presence is one of the principal narratives of globalization.
6
  A key 
ingredient in China’s grand strategy of expansion—foreign direct 
investment (FDI)—continues to raise serious concerns in the United States.  
Simply stated, “Foreign ownership of an American corporation provides a 
presence for that parent company’s country in the United States.”7  This 
creates a potential conduit for leaking American technology, intellectual 
property, and sensitive information pertaining to critical infrastructure.  
Repeated Chinese attempts to purchase American companies, particularly in 
markets deemed essential to national security, are alarming to policymakers 
given China’s challenge to American economic leadership.8 
In response to this potential threat, the United States has crafted an 
elaborate legislative framework to review foreign mergers and acquisitions 
for national security implications.  Pursuant to the Defense Production Act 
of 1950, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS)
9
 is now charged with implementing the review process.  Seen as 
an impediment to trade liberalization, however, some argue that CFIUS 
threatens economic productivity, potentially in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.
10
  They argue that such discrimination not only threatens future 
FDI in American markets, but also could lead to retaliatory measures by 
rebuffed investors, such as China, to the detriment of American investors 




 3  Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, and the Movements 
of People, 36 INT’L LAW. 91, 92 (2002). 
 4  Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The 
Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 L. 
& BUS. REV. AM. 381, 382 (2007). 
 5  E.g., id. at 383. 
 6  See infra Part II.B. 
 7  Mamounas, supra note 4, at 384. 
 8  See infra Part II.A. 
 9  Defense Production Act of 1950 §721, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012). 
 10  Mamounas, supra note 4, at 393. 
 11  Gaurav Sud, Note, From Fretting Takeovers to Vetting CFIUS: Finding a Balance in 
U.S. Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
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That fear of Chinese retaliation recently proved prescient.  In early 
2011, China codified its own national security review framework that 
mirrors the functionality of CFIUS.
12
  In light of this recent development, 
there is a renewed debate concerning the necessity, scope, and wisdom of 
the current national security review process, which potentially impedes 
trade and free market economics.  This Comment seeks to address the rise 
of these dueling national security review frameworks in the United States 
and China. 
In Part II, this Comment contextualizes the potential Chinese threat via 
FDI.  This includes a snapshot of the current U.S.-China trade relationship, 
as well as the most recent threat analysis according to the U.S. intelligence 
community.  Part III provides a detailed glimpse of the U.S. national 
security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions, including 
recent developments involving CFIUS.  As a juxtaposition, Part IV 
introduces the Chinese counterpart to CFIUS, and provides a comparison of 
the two national security review frameworks.  Part V proceeds to respond to 
the common criticisms of CFIUS through a case study approach.  This 
Comment contends that the alleged economic costs of CFIUS are both 
exaggerated and outweighed by the threat of economic espionage.  Finally, 
Part VI concludes that CFIUS, through its various iterations, strikes the 
proper balance between national security and economic interests. 
II. THE TWO FACES OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE THREAT 
FROM CHINA 
Despite the many benefits of globalization, there also exists a darker 
underside that is becoming exceedingly apparent.  While globalization 
expands economies, it also amplifies the inequalities that are inherent 
within market capitalism, often at the expense of the poor.
13
  However, the 
negative externalities of globalization are not confined to the underdogs; its 
effects are also felt in developed countries.  Just as globalization re-directs 
human capital into higher-skilled positions, U.S. workers lacking requisite 
qualifications are left vulnerable to the cold, profit-maximizing calculus of 
outsourcing.
14
  Coupled with the global recession, “millions of citizens have 
lost steady work . . . and a race to the bottom has been ignited abroad.”15  
The recent “Occupy Movement” is a testament to these social and economic 
ills. 
 
1303, 1325 (2006). 
 12  Lester Ross & Kenneth Zhou, China Adopts its Own ‘CFIUS’ Regulations, 
WILMERHALE (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9726. 
 13  Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 3. 
 14  Mamounas, supra note 4, at 383–84. 
 15  Id. at 384. 
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Furthermore, the era of globalization cannot be understood through the 
lens of an economic narrative alone.  Rather, a tale of two simultaneous 
transformations—one economic, the other political—more accurately 
describes our rapidly-changing world.  The free flow of people, ideas, and 
technologies—the trademark features of globalization—enables stagnant 
markets to flourish, but also de-stabilizes political institutions.
16
  The 
growing influence of transnational actors is not limited to multinational 
corporations; it also facilitates global crime syndicates and international 
terrorists.
17
  The tragic events of September 11, 2001 provide a dramatic 
lesson in the destructive potential of such stateless groups.  Yet, the ensuing 
“Age of Terror” is ultimately couched within the broader meta-narrative of 
globalization, and thus, is both a subset and a byproduct of the changing 
landscape of international relations.
18
  Such unintended consequences 
present detrimental challenges to both U.S. leadership and national security. 
A.  Globalization as a Challenge to American Hegemony 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has enjoyed sole 
superpower status.
19
  However, one of the more recent, principal storylines 
within the narrative of globalization has been the meteoric rise of China, 
both economically and militarily, as a threat to U.S. hegemony.  In the face 
of a lingering recession in the United States, China has continued its strong 
economic expansion with yearly double-digit GDP growth.
20
  As the United 
States’ “unipolar moment” inevitably gives way to a bipolar world marked 
by China’s ascendancy, some predict a violent transition in the global world 
order.
21
  Whether China intends for a peaceful rise to superpower status vis-
à-vis the United States remains to be seen. 
However, one thing is fairly certain: China intends to harness the full 
scope of economic opportunities within the international marketplace in its 
quest for regional and global dominance.  “The most farsighted Chinese 
leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China 
accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world.”22  Indeed, 
 
 16  Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 3, at 92–93. 
 17  Mamounas, supra note 4, at 384. 
 18  See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008). 
 19  See Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, Reshaping the World Order: How 
Washington Should Reform International Institutions, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2009; G. 
John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System 
Survive, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 2008. 
 20  Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong. 
12 (2011) [hereinafter Intelligence Hearings] (statement of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l 
Intelligence). 
 21  Ikenberry, supra note 19, at 26. 
 22  Id. at 30. 
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the recipe for China’s dramatic economic growth features an aggressive 
combination of an unparalleled supply of cheap labor, increased foreign 
investment, and its comparative advantage in trade.
23
 
The remarkable and unprecedented expansion of China’s global 
presence is well-documented.  Indeed, three decades of near double-digit 
economic expansion has provided ample time for the world to take notice.
24
  
While the Soviet Union’s policy of militarization as a means of expanding 
its sphere of influence ultimately proved unsustainable, China has instead 
focused on harnessing the opportunities of globalization.  “China’s embrace 
of foreign investment and trade has helped drive its transformation into a 
global economic powerhouse.”25  Despite China’s fairly recent economic 
liberalization, foreign capital has provided an integral boost to its growth as 
well.  In particular, the inflow of foreign capital has allowed for the transfer 
of “advanced technology” that has propelled its economy, as well as its 
“military and intelligence communities and, as a result, national security.”26 
This sensational economic growth, coupled with China’s formidable 
military prowess, seemingly places it on a collision course with the United 
States.  However, the implications of this growing challenge to U.S. 
hegemony remain hotly contested.
27
  Some are hopeful that the United 
States can accommodate China’s rise within the architecture of global, 
liberal institutions, thereby avoiding a “volcanic struggle” that promises 
catastrophe in light of their respective military capabilities.
28
  In fact, U.S. 
policymakers seemingly agreed with this proposition, given the United 
States’ critical role in paving the way for China’s accession into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.
29
 
However, the past decade of China’s involvement in the WTO has 
generated mixed results, tempering such hopeful projections.  On one hand, 
the United States and China have certainly engaged one another in a deeply 
entrenched economic relationship.  By 2010, “China was the second-largest 
 
 23  The Chinese Economy, ECONOMY WATCH, (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/china/?page=full. 
 24  U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 111TH CONG., ANN. REP. ON U.S.-CHINA 
TRADE RELATIONSHIP 17 (Comm. Print 2010). 
 25  Eric Jensen, Balancing Security and Growth: Defining National Security Review of 
Foreign Investment in China, 19 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 161, 164 (2010). 
 26  Id. 
 27  See generally Ikenberry, supra note 21. 
 28  Id. at 33–34. 
 29  WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 
24 (2011) (“Many U.S. policymakers at the time maintained that China’s WTO membership 
would encourage the Chinese government to deepen market reforms, promote the rule of 
law, reduce the government’s role in the economy, further integrate China into the world 
economy, and enable the United States to use the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism to 
address major trade issues.”). 
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U.S. trading partner (after Canada), the third-largest U.S. export market 
(after Canada and Mexico), and the largest source of U.S. imports.”30  On 
the other hand, the trade relationship with China has perpetuated deep-
seated asymmetries that threaten U.S. interests.  Trade with China has led to 
a dramatically lop-sided trade deficit,
31
 and China’s aggressive policy of 
investing in U.S. debt provides political leverage, especially during tough 
economic times in the United States.
32
 
B.  China as a Threat to U.S. National Security 
A more direct threat stems from China’s current FDI policy in 
advanced economies, such as the United States.  Not only do foreign 
mergers and acquisitions provide a foothold for the parent company’s 
country in the United States, they enable opportunities for unwanted 
proliferation of valuable intellectual property to foreign powers.
33
  
Arguably, “such investment is done largely to transfer technology and 
know-how to Chinese firms, but do little to help the U.S. economy.”34  This 
becomes problematic where Chinese multinational companies, some of 
which are government-sponsored, attempt to acquire American companies 
that deal with strategic assets or critical infrastructures.  This fear played a 
central role in forcing Lenovo, a company primarily owned by the Chinese 
government, to restructure its 2004 bid to acquire IBM’s personal computer 
business.
35
  “[T]he Departments of Justice and Homeland Security were 
especially concerned about Chinese infiltration of computer systems.”36  
Ultimately, the U.S. government demanded that both companies overcome 
national security concerns by physically sealing off the buildings that 
Lenovo and IBM would occupy in a shared complex in North Carolina.
37
 
Alternatively, the presence of Chinese companies in certain markets 
might directly corrupt manufacturing and distribution processes that cater to 
U.S. governmental use.
38
  The notion that domestic products or services 
could be compromised to enable foreign powers to eavesdrop, copy, or steal 
 
 30  Id. at 1. 
 31  Id. (“The U.S. trade deficit with China has surged over the past two decades, as U.S. 
imports from China have grown much faster than U.S. exports to China.”). 
 32  Id. at 10–14. 
 33  Robert Gray Blacknell, Trust Not Their Presents, Nor Admit the Horse: Countering 
the Technically-Based Espionage Threat, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 832, 856 (2007). 
 34  Morrison, supra note 29, at 17. 
 35  Id. at 17–18. 
 36  Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions That Imperil National Security: A Look at the 
Government’s Power to Say “No”, N.Y. ST. B.A.J., January 2005, at 20, 22. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Blacknell, supra note 33, at 838–39 (referencing the computer chip, 
telecommunication, and information systems as U.S. industries that are vulnerable to 
corruption in the manufacturing phase). 
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sensitive data or technology is not Hollywood fiction; it is a legitimate 
threat.  For example, the U.S. national security review process recently 
scuttled Bain Capital’s buyout of 3Com because it would have provided the 
Chinese company Huawei a minority stake in 3Com.  “The specific concern 
was that Huawei would gain access to the equipment maker’s technology 
which is used by the [U.S.] Defense Department.”39  Accordingly, 
investment policies must consider the risk of economic espionage through 
foreign acquisition of U.S. companies whose products may ultimately affect 
consumers within the U.S. national security apparatus.
40
 
The threat of economic espionage emanating from China is 
increasingly a concern for U.S. national security interests.  While China has 
focused heavily on economic growth through trade partnerships, its success 
has translated into a dramatic increase in its power potential relative to other 
countries.  In particular, the United States’ lop-sided trade deficit with 
China endows China with the upper hand in the economic sector, which 
subsequently provides China financial capital and technical expertise to 
expand its military capability and political clout.
41
 
This newfound power potential has shifted Chinese behavior toward its 
trading partners, as well as its traditional regional foes.  The most recent 
threat assessments from the U.S. intelligence community suggest a growing 
assertiveness within China’s international policies.42  China seemingly 
perceives that its economic success translates into increased clout to pursue 
its diplomatic and foreign policy objectives.
43
  For example, in addition to 
its outright support for North Korea’s recent military aggression toward 
South Korea, China has also advanced its efforts to expand territorial claims 
in the South China Sea, and has adopted intimidation tactics against Japan 




 39  Steven Globerman & Daniel Shapiro, Economic and Strategic Considerations 
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 163, 174 (2009). 
 40  Blacknell, supra note 33, at 841 (“Prudent counterespionage policy also requires a 
failsafe process on the U.S. end of the transaction to verify the efforts of the supplying 
companies, by assessing risk posed by foreign acquisitions of domestic business 
organizations and by detecting the existence of technically-based espionage devices or 
apparatus that slip through the company’s processes, in order to manage and apportion 
risk.”). 
 41  U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 24, at 14. 
 42  Intelligence Hearings, supra note 20 (statement of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l 
Intelligence) (“China’s rise drew increased international attention over the past year, as 
several episodes of assertive Chinese behavior fueled perceptions of Beijing as a more 
imposing and potentially difficult international actor.”). 
 43  Id. 
 44  U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 24, at 15 (“China has 
undermined the progress it had made over the past decade in promoting its peaceful rise with 
a renewed assertiveness in advancing its sovereignty claims to large areas in the East and 
South China Seas.”). 
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Moreover, China’s increasing aggressiveness has spilled over into its 
economic policies.  China has not concealed its desire to acquire trade 
secrets, sensitive information, and advanced technology through its 
investment policy.  “[S]ome businesses have publicly declared that they 
gradually are being squeezed out of Chinese markets by government 
policies that first demand technology transfer in exchange for market 
access.”45  Recently, the chairman of BASF Corporation criticized China’s 
policy of requiring disclosure of intellectual property as a precondition to 
conduct business in China.
46
  Thus, China’s thirst for advanced technology 
and access to intellectual property from foreign companies is quite 
apparent. 
In addition to its aggressive economic policies, China has allegedly 
resorted to economic espionage through cyberspace.
47
  The Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive warns that China has been at the 
forefront of accelerating efforts of “foreign economic collection and 
industrial espionage activities against major [U.S.] corporations.”48  The 
modes of economic espionage vary from the use of corporate insiders to 
sophisticated online hacking.  For example, “China’s intelligence services, 
as well as private companies and other entities, frequently seek to exploit 
Chinese citizens or persons with family ties to China who can use their 
insider access to corporate networks to steal trade secrets.”49  While this 
Comment will sidestep an in-depth discussion of the threat of cyber 
espionage, recent high-profile attempts to hack into major U.S. 
corporations, such as Google, offer significant anecdotal evidence of the 
rising threat of economic espionage emanating from China.
50
 
U.S. intelligence reports corroborate the fears of China’s desire to 
acquire sensitive economic information from U.S. corporations through 
illicit means.  Given this threat, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
unsurprisingly places counter-intelligence as its number two priority, only 
behind countering the more direct physical threat of terrorism.
51
  While 
calculating the exact cost of such economic espionage is difficult, the FBI 
estimates that “every year billions of U.S. dollars are lost to foreign and 
domestic competitors who deliberately target economic intelligence in 
 
 45  Id. at 20. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. at 15. 
 48  OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US 
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE, 112TH CONG., REP. TO CONG. ON FOREIGN ECON. 
COLLECTION & INDUS. ESPIONAGE 1 (Comm. Print. 2011). 
 49  Id. at 5.  This intelligence report also states that “[o]f the seven cases that were 
adjudicated under the Economic Espionage Act . . . in fiscal year 2010, six involved a link to 
China.”  Id. 
 50  Morrison, supra note 29, at 18. 
 51  Economic Espionage, supra note 2. 
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flourishing U.S. industries and technologies.”52  Yet, the “knowledge of 
cyber-enabled economic espionage threats to the U.S. private sector 
remains limited.”53  This reality highlights the importance of vetting foreign 
mergers and acquisitions into critical U.S. markets that implicate national 
security.  The threat of economic espionage is real, and national security 
reviews of proposed FDIs are an invaluable tool to curb the potential 
transfer of American trade secrets and critical technologies. 
III. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
Since World War II, the United States has been at the forefront of 
promoting economic liberalization in the international system.
54
  The 
United States has not only invested in various economies around the world, 
but its own economy has remained one of the key destinations for foreign 
capital.  Accordingly, the United States has “negotiate[d] internationally for 
reduced restrictions on foreign direct investment, for greater rules on 
incentives offered to foreign investors, and for equal treatment under law of 
foreign and domestic investors.”55  The United States’ commitment to an 




Nonetheless, national security considerations have always been 
recognized as a caveat to any investment policy.  Accordingly, “Most 
governments also have some form of statutory review process for foreign 
mergers and acquisitions in the domestic economy that look at a myriad of 
issues, including national security.”57  The challenge, however, lies in 
balancing two oft-competing interests: promoting an economy that is open 
to foreign investment and protecting national security from foreign threats.  
The U.S. national security review framework for foreign investment has 
faced this challenge at every stage of its evolution. 
A.  Historical Development of the U.S. Model 
The need for a national security review process in the United States 
became apparent in the 1970s as a result of the devaluation of the U.S. 
 
 52  Id. 
 53  OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 48, at A-1. 
 54  Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional 
Involvement is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 327 (2007). 
 55  JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 7 (2010). 
 56  Sud, supra note 11, at 1314. 
 57  Stephen Sothmann, Let He Who is Without Sin Cast the First Stone: Foreign Direct 
Investment and National Security Regulation in China, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203, 
205 (2009). 
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dollar, which led to an influx of FDI.
58
  In response, Congress passed the 
Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, which directed the Secretaries of 
Treasury and Commerce to review all foreign direct and portfolio 
investments.
59
  That comprehensive review demonstrated that Congress 
lacked an effective mechanism to examine the potential security 
implications of FDI.  As a result, President Ford established the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in 1975.
60
 
The purpose of this body was to observe “the impact of foreign 
investment in the [United States] . . . and coordinat[e] the implementation 
of United States Policy on such investment.”61  Yet initially, “CFIUS’s only 
power was to monitor investments and request foreign governments to file 
preliminary reports regarding their foreign investment activities.”62  Thus, 
CFIUS was conceived as a paper tiger with little to no enforcement power 
of its own. 
This glaring limitation surfaced most notably in 1987 with the 
attempted acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor Co. by Japanese 
computer company Fujitsu Ltd.  The proposed sale sparked vehement 
congressional opposition because “officials believed that the deal would 
give Japan control over a major supplier of computer chips for the 
military,” thereby “mak[ing] U.S. defense industries more dependent on 
foreign suppliers for sophisticated high-technology products.”63  Congress 
felt helpless given CFIUS’s impotency in blocking foreign mergers and 
acquisitions that might threaten national security.  Congress believed that 
“foreign takeovers of U.S. firms could not be stopped unless the President 
declared a national emergency or regulators invoked federal antitrust, 
environmental, or securities laws.”64 
In response to these growing concerns, Congress passed the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which included the Exon-Florio 
provision endowing CFIUS with much of its present authority.
65
  Relying 
on its power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress empowered the 
President to block proposed foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers 
 
 58  Joanna Rubin Travalini, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a 
Balance Between National Economic Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 779, 783 (2009). 
 59  Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450. 
 60  Travalini, supra note 58. 
 61  Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National 
Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?,70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 589 (2007). 
 62  Travalini, supra note 58. 
 63  JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 4 (2009). 
 64  Id. 
 65  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 
Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (codified at 50 USC app. § 2170 (2012)). 
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that “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States.66  
However, the President could invoke this authority to block proposed FDI 
only if two conditions were met: first, that no other law could adequately or 
appropriately protect the national security interest, and second, that credible 
evidence exists to believe that the proposed foreign investment will actually 
threaten national security.
67
  Nonetheless, President Reagan issued 
Executive Order 12661, which delegated his Exon-Florio authority to 
CFIUS.
68
  This newfound ability to conduct investigations and make 
presidential recommendations regarding proposed or completed foreign 
mergers and acquisitions transformed CFIUS from a toothless 
administrative body into a real consideration for foreign investors.
69
 
While CFIUS provides an additional layer of review to guard against 
potential national security threats, Congress did not intend to undercut its 
commitment to an open investment policy.
70
  In a liberal economic system, 
where “private ordering is favored and a trust of market forces is preached 
to generate the most economically sound outcome,” the persistent challenge 
is to broker a tenable balance between national security goals and economic 
interests.
71
  Yet, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 raised the 
stakes, rendering a heightened security environment.  Given the 
transnational composition and sophisticated financing mechanisms of 
global terrorism, Congress has sought to secure the borders.
72
  In 2003, 
CFIUS not only created more stringent preconditions for approving foreign 
acquisitions but also added the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
its membership.
73
  Accordingly, the DHS provided a clear national security 
advocate in the foreign investment review process. 
However, two developments in the global market triggered concerns 
over the sufficiency of the CFIUS process during the late 2000s.  First, 
much like the 1980s, the depreciation of the dollar increased the 
attractiveness of foreign investment in U.S. markets.  Bracing for another 
wave of FDI, Congress again sought to ensure that CFIUS was up to the 
task of reviewing proposed foreign mergers in critical industries linked to 
the U.S. national security apparatus.
74
  Second, the advent of sovereign 
wealth funds, which are tied to foreign national governments, projected new 
 
 66  JACKSON, supra note 63, at 3. 
 67  Id. at 3–4. 
 68  Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988). 
 69  JACKSON, supra note 63, at 5. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Sud, supra note 11, at 1325. 
 72  Travalini, supra note 58, at 787. 
 73  Id. 
 74  George Stephanov Georgiev, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: 
Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 
YALE J. ON REG. 125, 130 (2008). 
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threats to American markets.
75
  Accordingly, the “prototypical new 
purchasers of major assets . . . are government-controlled Chinese 
companies and the sovereign investment funds of petrol-rich Gulf states.”76 
For example, CFIUS became the focal point of criticism following the 
botched national security review of an attempt by Dubai Ports World, a 
company owned by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to acquire several 
U.S. ports.
77
  In its regular review process, CFIUS actually approved the 
deal, finding no credible evidence of an actual national security threat.
78
  
However, Congress, whose role in the review process was not clearly 
delineated, rejected CFIUS’s findings regarding the proposed transaction.  
Opponents of the acquisition feared foreign influence over U.S. port 
operations given “UAE’s history as an operational and financial base for the 
hijackers who carried out the September 11, 2001 attack.”79  Ultimately, 
Congress voted to block the transaction, which sparked a new round of 
concerns regarding the uncertainty of the CFIUS review process and 
renewed the call for additional legislation that would “clarify the CFIUS’s 
roles and powers.”80 
Ultimately, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA)
81
 in order to address growing uncertainty 
that followed Congress’s decision to block the Dubai Ports World deal after 
CFIUS had already approved it.  In order to avoid post-CFIUS interventions 
in the future, Congress expanded its oversight role in the review process.
82
  
Also, FINSA provided statutory grounding for CFIUS, which previously 
had relied solely on authority flowing from President Ford’s Executive 
Order in 1975.  By imposing heightened congressional reporting 
requirements on CFIUS, the new law attempts to increase transparency in 
the process by ensuring investors that each deal is thoroughly reviewed for 
national security implications prior to approval.
83
  Concurrently, FINSA 
establishes additional factors that CFIUS may consider in evaluating a 
proposed transaction’s impact on national security.84  Finally, FINSA 




 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Travalini, supra note 58, at 789–90. 
 78  Georgiev, supra note 74, at 131. 
 79  Mostaghel, supra note 61, at 606. 
 80  Travalini, supra note 58, at 790. 
 81  Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 
246. 
 82  JACKSON, supra note 63, at 1. 
 83  Travalini, supra note 58, at 793. 
 84  Georgiev, supra note 74, at 133.  For a more detailed discussion of the additional 
factors for consideration in the CFIUS review process, see infra Part III(B). 
 85  Id.  See infra Part III.B for a list of U.S. intelligence agencies that participate in the 
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Thus, FINSA attempts to strike an appropriate balance between protecting 
U.S. national security interests and promoting FDI in U.S. markets.
86
 
B.  Key Features of the U.S. Model 
In addition to the legislative expansion of its investigative and 
advisory powers, CFIUS has also undergone structural transformations 
since its inception in 1975.
87
  In its current form, the Secretary of Treasury 
serves as the chairperson for the review body, which spans sixteen 
governmental departments and offices.
88
  As membership in CFIUS has 
expanded over the years, the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Justice, 
and Homeland Security have continued to play the most active roles.
89
  
Unsurprisingly, the Department of Defense has also played an influential 
role in CFIUS’s national security assessments of foreign investment deals.90 
Procedurally, only “covered transactions” are subject to CFIUS 
review, though parties to a proposed foreign investment will usually 
provide voluntary notice to CFIUS along with necessary information related 
to the deal if it likely implicates national security.
91
  Under CFIUS 
regulations, “covered transactions” are defined as “any merger, acquisition, 
or takeover which results in ‘foreign control of any person engaged in 
interstate commerce in the United States.’”92  The Exon-Florio provision 
permits members of CFIUS to independently trigger a review of a proposed 
covered transaction.
93
  However, most filings are voluntary, because parties 
to a foreign investment scheme understand that a failure to provide notice to 




CFIUS review process. 
 86  Id. at 131. 
 87  Mamounas, supra note 4, at 391. 
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Following a proper filing, the Staff Chairperson will circulate the portfolio 
to CFIUS members for a maximum thirty-day review. 
If CFIUS harbors concerns that a proposed transaction might affect 
national security interests within that initial thirty-day review, then it must 
conduct a secondary forty-five-day investigation to clear the deal or 
recommend it for suspension or rejection.
95
  During this heightened stage, 
the President, vis-à-vis CFIUS, must conduct a national security 
investigation if one of the following three conditions is present: 
(1) as a result of a review of the transaction, CFIUS determines that 
the transactions threaten to impair the national security of the United 
States and that the threat had not been mitigated during or prior to a 
review of the transaction; (2) the foreign person is controlled by a 
foreign government; or (3) the transactions would result in the 
control of any critical infrastructure by a foreign person, the 
transactions could impair the national security, and that such 
impairment had not been mitigated.
96
 
At any point during the review process, parties are entitled to voluntarily 
withdraw from the review by nixing the deal, though they are subject to 
continuing notification requirements if the parties decide to re-file or pursue 
the transaction at a later date.
97
 
During the forty-five-day investigation, three outcomes are possible.  
First, CFIUS may clear the deal if it finds no national security threat.
98
  On 
the other hand, if CFIUS does find a valid threat, it could still clear the deal 
if another law can address the concern.
99
  Second, if CFIUS does find a 
national security threat, then it may work with the parties to the transaction 
to modify its terms to mitigate the national security concerns.
100
  Finally, 
CFIUS may file a non-binding recommendation to the President to suspend 
or reject the proposed transaction.
101
 
Once a recommendation is made to the President, he or she will have 
fifteen days to render a final decision as to the viability of the foreign 
investment.
102
  Where a transaction has already been completed prior to the 
 
Housing, and Urban Affairs (Oct. 20, 2005)). 
 95  Id. 
 96  JACKSON, supra note 63, at 12 (bracketed numbers in original). 
 97  Process Overview, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 
2012). 
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 100 Gotts et al., supra note 91, at 33. 
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 102 Sud, supra note 11, at 1317. 
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national security review, the President has the power to compel divesture.
103
  
However, in order to provide certainty to investors, the President may not 
prohibit a transaction if CFIUS had previously provided written notice to 
the parties that the transaction was not subject to the Exon-Florio provision, 
or affirmatively chose to forego review altogether, or the President had 
chosen to forego intervention for the same transaction.
104
 
The Exon-Florio provision originally established five factors for the 
President, as well as individual members of CFIUS, to consider during 
national security reviews of proposed foreign mergers, acquisitions, or 
takeovers.
105
  In 2007, Congress added seven factors for consideration 
during the review process.
106
  The amended Exon-Florio factors range from 
the proposed foreign investment’s impact on production capacity to meet 
national defense requirements to its effect on energy security, strategic 
assets, critical infrastructure, or even U.S. “technological leadership in areas 
affecting U.S. national security.”107  Consequently, opponents of the 
 
 103 Travalini, supra note 58, at 784. 
 104 Sud, supra note 11, at 1317. 
 105 Defense Production Act of 1950,  Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 502, 50 USC App. § 2170 
(1988). 
 106 JACKSON, supra note 63, at 12–13. 
 107 Id.  For a comprehensive list, the amended Exon-Florio factors are: 
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;  
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense 
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, 
materials, and other supplies and services; 
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens 
as it affects the capability and capacity of the U.S. to meet the requirements of 
national security; 
(4) the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates 
missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; and transactions identified 
by the Secretary of Defense as “posing a regional military threat” to the interests of 
the United States; 
(5) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological leadership in areas 
affecting U.S. national security; 
(6) whether the transaction has a security-related impact on critical infrastructure 
in the United States; 
(7) the potential effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major 
energy assets; 
(8) the potential effects on United States critical technologies; 
(9) whether the transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction; 
(10) in those cases involving a government-controlled transaction, a review of (A) 
the adherence of the foreign country to nonproliferation control regimes, (B) the 
foreign country’s record on cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, (C) the 
potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military applications; 
(11) the long-term projection of the United States requirements for sources of 
energy and other critical resources and materials; and 
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national security review process are concerned that these amended factors 
subject foreign investment transactions to greater hurdles in the approval 
process. 
Admittedly, CFIUS has evolved into a more intensive review body 
with greater powers to block proposed foreign investments.  Most notably, 
the amendments broaden the scope of CFIUS review by including a host of 
other economic security considerations in addition to the former, more 
traditional national defense interests.
108
  In particular, the focus on “critical 
infrastructure,” as defined broadly in the statute, enables the President to 
consider a proposed transaction’s effect beyond national security, including 
“national economic security and national public health or safety.”109  
Finally, the lack of a specific, limited definition of “national security” 
arguably subjects sound economic investments to an arbitrary and 
capricious review process.
110
  Part V of this Comment, however, 
demonstrates that these economic concerns are either overblown or 
outweighed by other concerns. 
IV. THE CHINESE APPROACH: CFIUS’S COUNTERPART 
While the United States’ approach to reviewing foreign investments 
for national security concerns has evolved for nearly four decades, China’s 
framework is in its nascent stages.  Given that China’s new model came 
into existence in the wake of several failed acquisitions of U.S. companies 
in the United States, some fear that the model is reactionary in motive.  
However, China’s national security review process can also be seen as the 
next logical step in the continued liberalization of its economy.  This 
portion of the Comment analyzes the historical buildup to China’s adoption 
of a formal national security review process for foreign mergers and 
acquisitions, as well as key features of the model. 
A.  Historical Development of the Chinese Model 
Unlike the United States, the historical record for Chinese FDI policies 
is relatively short.  In fact, prior to 1983, China prohibited foreign 
acquisitions of Chinese businesses altogether.
111
  Since then, however, the 
world has witnessed an “ongoing transition of [China]’s economy from a 
centrally planned one to a ‘market economy with socialist 
 
(12) such other factors as the President or the Committee determine to be 
appropriate. 
Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 13. 
 110 See infra Part V. 
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characteristics.’”112  As its economy has liberalized, China has become 
more favorable to foreign investment and capital.  In the decades spanning 
1983 to 2003, however, the Chinese government lacked a standardized 
framework for evaluating foreign mergers and acquisitions.
113
  Following a 
contentious failed acquisition in 2006 of Xugong Construction Machinery 
Group—China’s largest construction machinery manufacturer—by the 
American-based management firm Carlyle Group,
114
 China’s Ministry of 
Commerce adopted a revised set of regulations concerning foreign mergers 
and acquisitions in China.
115
 
Despite these newly adopted rules, China did not formally provide for 
a national security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions until 
2007, when it adopted a long-awaited, comprehensive antitrust law.
116
  
Within that legislation, Article 31 formally envisions concurrent national 
security review of foreign investment, along with the primary antitrust 
review.
117
  Even then, China still lacked a formalized national security 
framework, such as CFIUS, until the United States blocked a controversial 
merger between Huawei and 3Leaf in 2010.
118
 
Finally, on February 3, 2011, China’s State Council General Office 
issued the Notice Concerning Establishment of the Security Review System 
on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
(Security Review Notice).
119
  The Security Review Notice establishes the 
Chinese counterpart to CFIUS—a national security review process for 
foreign mergers and acquisitions in Chinese markets.
120
  After a six-month 
trial period, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued the 
Regulation on Implementing of the Security Review System for Mergers 
 
 112 H. STEPHEN HARRIS JR. ET AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 1 
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 113 Deas, supra note 111, at 1804. 
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and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.
121
 
The motive behind China’s decision to pursue a formal national 
security review process remains hotly contested.  Arguably, the temporal 
proximity of the Security Review Notice to the adverse CFIUS review of 
the Huawei-3Leaf transaction suggests protectionist backlash.  On the other 
hand, China’s new review process for incoming foreign investments was 
inevitable in light of its mention in Article 31 of China’s antitrust law.  
Regardless of the reason, the international business community has 
witnessed the rise of dueling national security review frameworks in the 
United States and China—the world’s top two recipients of FDI.122 
B.  Key Features of the Chinese Model 
Similar to CFIUS’s broad membership across governmental 
departments, China’s national security review process involves an inter-
ministerial approach.
123
  China’s review body is referred to as the Joint 
Inter-Ministerial Security Review Committee.
124
  At the helm, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) and MOFCOM serve as 
the leadership for the national security review process under the Chinese 
model.
125
  Similar to FINSA’s effect on CFIUS, the new national security 
review legislation grounds the NRDC’s role with statutory authority, unlike 
previously, where it served as an informal consultant to the review of 
mergers and acquisitions for antitrust violations.
126
 
Unlike the CFIUS framework, however, China’s new national security 
review process mandates investors to file applications with MOFCOM in 
order to initiate review of proposed transactions.
127
  The Chinese model’s 
equivalent of a covered transaction is defined as a foreign merger or 
acquisition involving any one of the following: 
[1] A foreign investor purchases the equity interests of a Chinese 
enterprise or subscribes to the increased capital of a Chinese 
enterprise[;] 
[2] A foreign investor purchases the equity interests of a Chinese 
shareholder of a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) in China or 
subscribes to the increased capital of an FIE[;] 
[3] A foreign investor sets up an FIE and uses it to purchase and 
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 122 FDI by Country, GREYHILL ADVISORS, http://greyhill.com/fdi-by-country/ (last visited 
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operate the assets of a Chinese enterprise, or uses the FIE to 
purchase the equity interests of a Chinese enterprise[;] 
[4] A foreign investor directly purchases the assets of a Chinese 
enterprise, and sets up an FIE in use of the assets, which then 
operates on the assets[.]
128
 
In addition to the Chinese review process’s coverage of direct mergers 
and acquisitions, the framework also exercises jurisdiction over transactions 
that would lead to de facto control of Chinese entities through foreign 
investment.  This includes: 
(1) direct or indirect acquisition by a foreign investor of 50% or 
more of the shares in a domestic enterprise; (2) acquisition by a 
group of foreign investors of 50% or more of the shares in a 
domestic enterprise; (3) acquisition of material influence over 
decisions of the shareholders meeting or board of directors even with 
less than 50% of the shares; or (4) acquisition of actual control over a 
domestic enterprise’s policies, finances, personnel or technology. 
The application to acquisition of actual control signifies that the 




Foreign investors that fall within the ambit of these investment 
categories are required to file an application with MOFCOM to determine 
whether further review is required.
130
  Similar to the CFIUS model, China’s 
Security Review Committee is also empowered to independently open 
national security investigations into proposed foreign investment 
transactions.
131
  Unlike the U.S. framework, however, “other government 
ministries, national trade associations, other companies in the industry and 
domestic enterprises can also ask MOFCOM to initiate an investigation.”132  
Thus, the Chinese model offers far greater avenues and opportunities to 
scrutinize foreign mergers and acquisitions through the national security 
review process. 
Unlike the initial month-long investigation under CFIUS, once 
MOFCOM initiates the review process, it will conduct a general review 
lasting no longer than twenty days, during which the Security Review 
Committee will “solicit written opinions from the relevant authorities.”133  
Similar to the initial stage under CFIUS, this review enables MOFCOM to 
clear a transaction where there is no evidence of an adverse national 
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security impact stemming from the proposed transaction.  However, if the 
proposed transaction does raise national security concerns, the Security 
Review Committee will conduct a heightened, secondary review process 
that lasts no longer than sixty days.
134
  Similar to the American approach 
under CFIUS, parties to a proposed transaction are free to withdraw their 
application for review at any time during the heightened security review.
135
 
At the conclusion of the secondary review stage, the Security Review 
Committee can render three potential recommendations to MOFCOM: (1) 
approve the transaction, (2) block the transaction, or (3) like the American 
approach under FINSA, allow the transaction to proceed subject to remedial 
preconditions.
136
  These recommendations, however, are non-binding, and 
unlike the U.S. model where the President makes the final determination, 




Similar to the CFIUS framework and its implementing regulations, the 
rules set forth in China’s 2011 legislation establishes various factors for 
consideration during its national security review process.  These factors 
include: 
[1] Influence of the M&A transaction over national [defense] 
(including capacity of manufacturing domestic products, providing 
domestic services or providing the facilities and equipments in 
question for national [defense])[;] 
[2] Influence of the M&A transaction over the stable running of 
China’s economy[;] 
[3] Influence of the M&A transaction over basic social life and 
order[;] 
[4] Influence of the M&A transaction over research and development 
of key technology regarding national security[.]
138
 
Interestingly, the scope of review under the Chinese model is much 
broader than the U.S. model.  While the factors for consideration under 
CFIUS also extend beyond national defense interests, the Chinese model 
purportedly covers “transactions involving important agricultural products, 
energy and resources, infrastructure facilities, and transportation services[,] 
core technologies[,] and important equipment manufacturing 
enterprises.”139  While both models raise hurdles for proposed transactions, 
the Chinese national security review framework seemingly could cover 
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transactions that have almost no nexus with national security.
140
  Thus, 
China’s national security review model enjoys a broader scope of review 
than its U.S. counterpart.
141
 
V. CFIUS IN ACTION: A RESPONSE TO CRITICISM 
While the immediate impact of China’s new model for reviewing 
foreign mergers and acquisitions remains to be seen, its creation has 
reinvigorated critics of national security reviews.  Their concerns revolve 





backlash from perceived protectionism,
144
 and the politicization of 
economics.
145
  The common thread linking the diverse critiques of national 
security reviews of foreign investment is a general uneasiness over 
Congress’s perceived interference in free trade and economics.  However, it 
is common knowledge that the U.S. Constitution secures the role of 
Congress in regulating interstate commerce.
146
  The more relevant question 
is whether Congress’s regulation of foreign mergers and acquisitions vis-à-
vis CFIUS is sufficiently transparent to minimize the chilling effect on 
economic relations.  By this measure, CFIUS has admittedly rendered 
mixed results in the past, thereby validating—at least in part—the above-
mentioned criticisms. 
This portion of the Comment addresses past arbitrary congressional 
action involving CFIUS reviews of proposed Chinese acquisitions of U.S. 
companies.  This Part argues that legislative amendments to CFIUS have 
since addressed concerns of transparency, ambiguity, and politicization of 
trade.  Various case studies demonstrate that a changing national security 
landscape, as well as an evolving national security review process, negates 
or outweighs the proposed costs of CFIUS and its Chinese counterpart. 
A.  Ensuring Transparency 
Perhaps the most controversial transaction that fell victim to national 
security concerns in the United States involves China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) and its attempted takeover of California-based 
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energy firm Unocal in 2005.
147
  Amidst negotiations by Chevron—an 
American multinational energy corporation—to purchase Unocal, CNOOC 
interjected with an unsolicited $18.5 billion takeover bid that topped 
Chevron’s offer by nearly $2 billion.148  The very next day, forty-one 
members of Congress requested immediate CFIUS review of the proposed 
Chinese takeover as a matter of U.S. national security.
149
  Within a week, 
Congress overwhelmingly passed House Resolution 344, formally voicing 
its concerns over the proposed acquisition.
150
  As a sign of good faith, 
CNOOC voluntarily requested that CFIUS analyze the transaction for 
potential national security complications.
151
  Yet, the intense scrutiny 
rendered the proposed Chinese takeover dead on arrival—CNOOC 




The CNOOC-Unocal fiasco has justifiably served as the poster child 
for the purported lack of transparency in the U.S. national security review 
process.  In many ways, CNOOC’s failed attempt to acquire UNOCAL 
demonstrates Congress’s perception of CFIUS as a weak review body prior 
to the passage of FINSA in 2007.  Indeed, CNOOC ultimately withdrew its 
bid in the face of strong legislative opposition to the proposed merger, 
rather than formal negative treatment by CFIUS.  In its press release 
following the withdrawal, CNOOC blamed “unprecedented political 
opposition” from Congress that ultimately created a “level of uncertainty 
that present[ed] an unacceptable risk” to completing the merger.153  Still, it 
is unlikely that CNOOC would have secured approval from the President 




It is important to note that Congress’s staunch opposition to the 
CNOOC-Unocal transaction—though controversial—was justified.  Indeed, 
Congress expressed a variety of national security concerns surrounding a 
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potential CNOOC-Unocal merger in House Resolution 344.
155
  While the 
proposed merger fell apart prior to formal CFIUS review, the objections 
offered in the Resolution provide insight into the likely outcome had the 
proposed deal reached the formal national security review process. 
Arguably, Congress’s fundamental concern with the merger—as 
House Resolution 344 indicates—stemmed from CNOOC’s corporate 
structure and identity: “China owns approximately 70 percent of 
CNOOC.”156  In addition to CNOOC’s significant ties to the Chinese 
government, the proposed merger would have been “financed and heavily 
subsidized” by state-owned banking institutions.157  In a parallel 
investigation of the proposed transaction, the House Armed Services 
Committee expounded on this concern: “Chinese enterprises do not behave 
as normal commercial companies on the international market.”158  Unlike 
purely private foreign investment, the CNOOC-Unocal transaction would 
have effectively injected a foreign power into the U.S. economy. 
Second, the Resolution voices national security concerns arising from 
CNOOC’s potential control over oil and natural gas resources, which are 
paramount strategic assets.
159
  Citing China’s increasingly voracious 
appetite for oil, the Resolution emphasized the strategic importance of 
maintaining U.S. control over its own energy resources.
160
  The proposed 
merger, on the other hand, “would result in [Unocal’s] strategic assets . . . 
being preferentially allocated to China by the Chinese government.”161  As 
a result, the Resolution found that CNOOC would directly control nearly 
one-third of excess oil supply in the world.
162
  Moreover, the House Armed 
Services Committee found that Unocal’s oil reserves spanned the globe 
“from the Gulf of Mexico to the Caspian region to Southeast Asia, as well 
as in Africa, Europe, and South America.”163  Thus, China’s acquisition of 
Unocal’s strategic assets vis-à-vis CNOOC would present a zero-sum 
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reduction of U.S. influence in those regional oil markets.
164
 
Finally, the Resolution forewarned of the potential proliferation of 
sensitive dual-use technologies
165
 employed in the oil industry for 
exploration, production, and refining.
166
  “The dangerous possibility of 
these dual commercial/military use technologies falling into Chinese hands 
is alarming given the tenuous nature of Sino-American relations.”167  
Coupled with China’s unconcealed desire to acquire advanced technology 
through FDIs,
168
 its oil companies, like CNOOC, operate in countries 
currently facing U.S. economic and military sanctions.
169
  The risk of 
secondary proliferation of these sensitive, dual-use technologies to adverse 
countries, such as Iran, would also threaten U.S. national security.
170
 
Nevertheless, the failure of the formal national security process to take 
effect in the proposed CNOOC-Unocal acquisition feeds the perception that 
Congress may obstruct viable transactions in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.  Admittedly, “without thorough statutory review, the case-by-case 
approach in each transaction provides little regularity and poor 
transparency.”171  Despite CNOOC’s late attempt to voluntarily submit 
information about the proposed transaction to CFIUS, “congressional 
leaders haphazardly held press conferences, gave interviews, and introduced 
legislation, the product of which was a political snowball against which 
CNOOC . . . had no hope.”172  The lack of clear, identifiable criteria within 
the national security review process will stoke future criticism of CFIUS as 
a non-transparent, unbridled oversight body.
173
 
Fortunately, CFIUS has undergone various transformative changes 
since the CNOOC-Unocal debacle.
174
  In 2007, Congress approved FINSA, 
which made several critical changes to the preexisting iteration of CFIUS, 
primarily to ensure a more transparent national security review process.
175
  
For example, FINSA now mandates initial review of all covered 
transaction, which “ensur[es] that every transaction involving foreign 
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investment receives attention from the CFIUS.”176  Thus, parties to a 
proposed foreign merger, acquisition, or takeover can expect to provide 
preliminary information about the deal regardless of whether CFIUS 
initiates the review or the parties themselves voluntarily seek government 
approval. 
Additionally, FINSA serves to provide parties to a covered transaction 
with common risk factors that have implicated U.S. national security in the 
past.
177
  For instance, CFIUS is now required to “issue guidance on the 
types of transactions previously reviewed that presented national security 
and critical infrastructure concerns.”178  Also, “Implementing regulations 
finalized in 2008 provide many illustrative examples to show what level of 
corporate control is sufficient to trigger CFIUS review.”179  Prior to the 
passage of FINSA, foreign corporations like CNOOC lacked notice of 
thresholds for transactional risk that could trigger CFIUS review. 
Furthermore, FINSA introduces specific reporting requirements for 
CFIUS in an effort to limit broader congressional intervention in the 
national security review process.  Prior to FINSA, “The Exon-Florio 
amendment required quadrennial reports to Congress, yet after an initial 
report in 1993 no such reports were submitted for the next dozen years.”180  
Following passage of FINSA, CFIUS must now submit an annual report to 
Congress that “summarize[s] trends and the previous year’s activity.”181  
For pending transactions under review, FINSA also mandates that CFIUS 
provide notice and certification of its findings during the forty-five-day, 
secondary review phase for a specified transaction.
182
  These amended 
requirements increase the transparency of the CFIUS review process, define 
Congress’s role in national security reviews of foreign investment, and 
deter premature, capricious governmental intervention.
183
 
In retrospect, critics of CFIUS are admittedly correct to point out the 
review body’s checkered history of operational transparency.  The botched 
CNOOC-Unocal merger certainly fanned the fears of an arbitrary national 
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security review process that left foreign investors uncertain about future 
transactions.  Congress has since legislated improvements to CFIUS in an 
effort to increase transparency and to clarify congressional involvement in 
these national security reviews.  Indeed, the CNOOC-Unocal controversy is 
a reminder of the importance of such measures, which serve to render a 
more predictable review process where the transaction does in fact 
implicate U.S. national security interests. 
B.  Defining National Security 
Since CNOOC withdrew its bid to acquire Unocal, two other failed 
foreign acquisitions involving Chinese corporations have fueled criticism of 
CFIUS’s scope.  In particular, Congress has failed to establish a “functional 
definition of the national economic security implications of foreign direct 
investment.”184  This lack of a clear statutory definition of the term 
“national security” raises fears of far-reaching reviews.185  As a result, 
critics contend that heightened congressional involvement will lead to the 
politicization of foreign investment.
186
 
However, this fear of congressional over-involvement overlooks the 
historical foundation of U.S. economics, as well as the current realities of 
global threats.
187
  In response to the heightened security environment 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
188
 Congress broadened 
the scope of national security considerations through the passage the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, which added “critical infrastructure” as part of the 
nation’s security apparatus.189  In light of this shift in congressional attitude, 
“policymakers have concluded that economic activities are a separately 
identifiable component of national security.”190  Thus, a broader approach 
to CFIUS review of foreign investment is necessary to address modern 
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threats of economic espionage.
191
 
In fact, Congress intentionally declined to provide a more limited 
definition of “national security” within the Exon-Florio statute.192  Instead, 
Congress envisioned a flexible interpretation of the term in order to cut 
across various critical industries.
193
  While this approach does invite some 
unpredictability, the Department of Treasury states that “each member of 
CFIUS is expected to apply that definition of national security that is 
consistent with the representative agency’s specific legislative mandate.”194  
Congress also added several factors to consider in evaluating national 
security implications of FDI, in particular, the proposed transaction’s 
impact on “critical infrastructure” in the United States.195 
Critics ultimately fear that such a broad definition of national security 
enables Congress to politicize foreign investment by disfavoring countries, 
such as China, that might represent a threat to U.S. economic hegemony.
196
  
Admittedly, this concern arises each time a political body like Congress 
regulates any field.  By constitutional design, however, FDI falls within the 
Legislature’s purview to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.  As 
such, “many policymakers apparently perceive greater risks to the economy 
arising from foreign investments in which the foreign investor is owned or 
controlled by foreign governments.”197  More importantly, critics that reject 
Congress’s broad role in regulating FDI fail to appreciate a new reality— 
national economy and national security are inherently intertwined. 
1.  Firstgold & Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Company 
Following the passage of FINSA and Congress’s attempt to clarify the 
national security review process, CFIUS again found itself embroiled in 
controversy during a Chinese investment company’s friendly takeover bid 
of Firstgold—a relatively small mining company based in Nevada.  In July 
2009, Firstgold announced that China’s Northwest Non-Ferrous 
International Investment Company (Northwest) had agreed to purchase 
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$26.5 million in secured debt in return for a “51 percent of outstanding 
common shares to become Firstgold’s majority shareholder.”198  Unlike the 
CNOOC-Unocal fiasco, however, Congress “made no public statements 
regarding the Firstgold deal, instead allowing CFIUS alone to resolve its 
security concerns.”199  Nonetheless, Northwest’s bid to acquire Firstgold 
ultimately shared the same fate as CNOOC, as the deal fell apart in the face 
of impending negative treatment by CFIUS.
200
 
As the two parties to the agreement voluntarily withdrew from CFIUS 
review, Firstgold CEO Terry Lynch publicly expressed that he failed to 
understand the nexus between his company’s assets, which primarily 
consisted of an open-pit facility at Relief Canyon Mine,
201
 and U.S. national 
security.
202
  In fact, neither party seemingly believed that the transaction 
would implicate national security, given the relatively small size of the 
investment and the nature of Firstgold’s business as compared to other 
transactions that triggered CFIUS review in the past.
203
  However, once 
Firstgold and Northwest volunteered for national security review, CFIUS 
found that the deal was clearly a “covered transaction,” given that the 
proposed acquisition would result in foreign control over Firstgold. 
Upon closer examination, a unique set of circumstances surrounding 
the transaction led CFIUS to render an adverse recommendation to 
President Obama to block the acquisition.  First, the identity and corporate 
structure of Northwest—an investment firm owned and operated by the 
Chinese provincial government of Shaanxi—raised the same red flag as in 
the CNOOC ordeal. “Procedurally, Section 721 [of the Defense Production 
Act of 1950] virtually mandates that CFIUS proceed to the full 
investigation stage where the foreign investing party is state-owned or 
controlled.”204  Though this factor is not conclusive to CFIUS’s ultimate 
findings, Firstgold’s shock that CFIUS chose to conduct the secondary 
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The second and perhaps the most determinative factor that compelled 
CFIUS to render an adverse recommendation was the target company’s 
location.  While the proposed transaction arguably did not involve a 
strategic asset—such as oil in the earlier CNOOC-Unocal merger—the 
physical site of Firstgold’s assets posed a unique threat to U.S. national 
security interests.
206
  “The primary source of concern among CFIUS 
officials was the proximity of four mines to the Fallon Naval Air 
Station.”207  Moreover, in a publicly leaked memorandum of the 
Committee’s communication with Firstgold, CFIUS officials suggested a 
possible national security threat to “other sensitive and classified security 
and military assets that cannot be identified.”208  Arguably, these unique 
circumstances surrounding the Firstgold-Northwest transaction made an 
adverse CFIUS review unavoidable.
209
  The bottom line is that “location 
matters when military facilities occupy the neighborhood.”210 
2.  Huawei & 3Leaf Systems 
More recently, CFIUS again flexed its newfound authority in 
requesting the divestment of a completed acquisition involving Huawei 
Technologies Company and California-based 3Leaf Systems.
211
  In May 
2010, Huawei spent $2 million for intellectual property rights from 3Leaf, a 
company that “specializes in building servers to run together as more 
powerful mainframe computers.
212
  Huawei—China’s largest 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer—and 3Leaf consummated the 
deal without voluntary notice to CFIUS.
213
  Acting on its independent 
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review authority, CFIUS requested that Huawei initiate the review process 
to determine if national security issues were present in the completed 
transaction.
214
  Nearly nine months after Huawei acquired various 
technology patents from 3Leaf, CFIUS ultimately recommended 
“voluntary” divestment or risk an adverse recommendation to President 
Obama to undo the deal.
215
 
Similar to the fates of CNOOC and Northwest in their acquisition 
attempts, Huawei came under close scrutiny given its corporate identity.  
However, its failed attempt to acquire 3Leaf assets is not the first time 
Huawei has been subjected to the national security review process for 
foreign mergers and acquisitions.
216
  In the past five years, Huawei 
repeatedly found itself on CFIUS’s radar due to security concerns with 
failed transactions involving 3Com and Sprint.
217
  Indeed, American 
lawmakers have shown a deep-seated distrust of Huawei due to its 
purported ties with the Chinese military.
218
  According to a 2005 RAND 
report, Huawei—touted as a “national champion” in China—purportedly 
“maintains deep ties with the Chinese military, which serves a multi-faceted 
role as an important customer, as well as Huawei’s political patron and 
research and development partner.”219 
Given these findings, it is no surprise that CFIUS has repeatedly 
scrutinized Huawei’s attempts to enter into the U.S. telecommunications 
market, a critical infrastructure  directly implicating the Exon-Florio factors 
for consideration in the national security review process.
220
  Indeed, 
Huawei’s purported link to the Chinese military raises the specter of 
economic or cyber espionage by allowing Huawei to potentially corrupt 
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telecommunications equipment that the Department of Defense or other 
vestiges of the national security apparatus relies upon.
221
  Coupled with the 
uptick in Chinese cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures, Huawei’s 
potential ties to China’s military poses a considerable roadblock to its 




Ultimately, the failed foreign investment transactions between 
Northwest and Firstgold, as well as Huawei and 3Leaf, demonstrate the 
need for a broad approach to defining national security within the CFIUS 
review process.  While both transactions suggest hostility toward Chinese 
multinational corporations, CFIUS’s response in each appropriately 
considered real national security implications in the proposed transactions.  
The target company’s physical proximity to military installations or the 
acquiring company’s ties to a foreign military raises red flags for any 
sovereign, because these attributes increase the potential for economic or 
military espionage.  More importantly, a narrow interpretation of “national 
security” in the review process for foreign investments would likely 
overlook such possibilities for information leakage or technology transfer.  
Thus, the broader conceptualization of “national security” by CFIUS is 
necessary to deal with nuanced threats in the era of globalization. 
C.  Managing Economic Repercussions 
As a response to the realities of the post-9/11 security environment, an 
increased role for CFIUS in regulating foreign investment is well-intended.  
However, the unintended or perceived consequences of a particular policy 
can ultimately be as important to its success.  Prior to the passage of 
FINSA, critics forewarned that “[s]ubstantial changes in the analytical 
framework governing [CFIUS’s] evaluation of national security 
considerations related to proposed mergers, acquisitions and takeovers 
could have sweeping implications for investor confidence.”223  This 
criticism is grounded in the overblown charges of non-transparency and 
ambiguity addressed above.
224
  If true, investor uncertainty theoretically 
“could lead foreign firms to abandon plans to merge, or acquire American 
companies entirely.”225  Moreover, the added scrutiny admittedly increases 




Even worse, some fear that foreign investors—and their respective 
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governments—will perceive heightened CFIUS review as economic 
protectionism.
227
  At least one critic goes so far as to argue that “identifying 
the factors that lead to blockage of the deal might be the equivalent of 
declaring hostilities against the acquiring company’s government.”228  
Given the United States’ traditional policy of open investment, critics 
contend that perceived hostility to foreign mergers or acquisitions involving 
U.S. companies will trigger protectionist backlash.
229
  It is argued that such 
“[o]verreaching U.S. regulation of foreign investment will trigger retaliation 
by other governments and undoubtedly hurt U.S. investors abroad.”230  
China’s recent CFIUS-like model regulating foreign investment provides 
timely fodder for such criticisms.
231
 
Much like the complaints regarding CFIUS’s overbroad scope and lack 
of transparency, these economic concerns are ultimately outweighed.  
Above all, the United States is one of many major economies that permits 
governmental regulation of foreign mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers.
232
  
Arguably, “there are more, and better developed, statutory restrictions on 
foreign investment in place in foreign jurisdictions than in the United 
States.”233  While China’s newly-created national security review 
framework follows on the heels of the failed Huawei-3Leaf transaction, its 
policy to review foreign investment for potential national security threats 
was already well-established by its antitrust regulations released in 2007.
234
 
Rather, China’s heightened national security review process—much 
like CFIUS in the United States—comports with global standards.  For 
example, many of the world’s prominent international trade regimes, like 
the WTO,  “allow signatory nations the right to deny foreign investment in 
areas of the economy deemed integral to the national security interests of 
that nation.”235  The notion that CFIUS undercuts the global liberal 
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economy is inconsistent with the widely-held belief that a nation has the 
right to protect its national security from adverse foreign investment.  “This 
exception to free trade has been a part of the global economy since the 
earliest free trade agreements.”236  CFIUS is no exception to that 
international standard. 
This defense of CFIUS’s role in the global economy does not purport 
to argue that national security reviews have no impact on a nation’s 
economic calculus.  On the contrary, as one policy expert explains: 
Within the economy, economic theory maintains that demand and 
supply forces determine the market prices for labor and for capital as 
the various sectors compete for these scarce resources.  These market 
prices, then, work to allocate resources within the economy among 
the vast array of economic activities that use the resources in the 
most efficient manner.  Interference in this process, regardless of the 
reason, can cause a misallocation of resources in the economy and a 




Admittedly, the national security review process for foreign 
investment potentially interferes with otherwise economically viable 
mergers or acquisitions.  For example, in the failed CNOOC-Unocal 
acquisition, Unocal was arguably deprived of capitalizing on CNOOC’s 
offer, which exceeded Chevron’s eventual winning bid by approximately $2 
billion.
238
  Thus, regulatory frameworks like CFIUS “may also alter the 
allocation of capital within the economy and, thereby, incur short-term and 
long-term costs to the economy.”239 
Nonetheless, critics’ claims regarding the adverse economic impacts of 
CFIUS fail to capture the complexity of calculating economic costs.  
Simply calculating the lost value of a CFIUS-blocked foreign investment as 
a tell-tale economic cost ignores the national security benefits captured.  
Critics are correct in pointing out that such national security benefits are not 
easily quantifiable and are context-dependent.
240
  That contention, however, 
is a double-edged sword.  Simply put, there is no “precise way . . . to 
estimate the exact dollar amount for the economic costs and benefits of 
national policies that attempt to direct or restrict foreign direct investment 
for national security concerns.”241  However there is one certainty: the costs 
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associated with adverse foreign investment, including economic espionage 
or the transfer of lucrative intellectual property to the acquiring country are 
staggering.
242
  Accordingly, in order to justify CFIUS’s intervention in any 
particular proposed foreign investment, policymakers will have to weigh 
the economic and non-economic costs and benefits.  This balancing 
approach is more of an art than a science, which critics tend to overlook. 
Instead, critics of CFIUS review—and its foreign counterparts—focus 
on statistics that seemingly support their fears of regression in the face of 
increased regulations.  For example, it is true that the amount of FDI 
declined by nearly twenty-five percent from 2008 to 2009.
243
  That statistic, 
however, is hardly conclusive of the purported decline in FDI as a result of 
a heightened national security review process following passage of FINSA 
in 2007.  For instance, the amount of FDI into the United States in 2008 
“set a record in nominal terms for the most amount of foreign direct 
investment in the economy in a year.”244  While fiscal year 2009 failed to 
match that impressive mark from the year before in absolute terms, 
cumulative FDI still increased by seven percent.
245
 
More importantly, critics relying on general year-to-year changes in 
FDI ignore the importance of economic conditions in encouraging foreign 
investment in the first place.  “The decrease in foreign direct investment 
flows mirrors a slowdown in global flows.”246  It is no secret that the U.S. 
economy is not immune to the global economic crisis, which has adversely 
impacted foreign mergers and acquisitions.
247
  Conversely, “As the rate of 
growth of the U.S. economy rises, interests rates stay low, and the rate of 
price inflation stays in check, foreign direct investment . . . likely will 
continue to rise.”248  Given these current global economic conditions, it 
would be disingenuous to argue that CFIUS is the driver of a contraction in 
foreign investment.  Rather, foreign investment is as much a function of a 
complex globalized economy as it is of a heightened domestic regulatory 
regime. 
Nonetheless, “[t]he real test for the amended regulatory framework” 
will rest in part upon “the ability of the executive branch to inspire and 
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maintain public confidence in the new CFIUS process.”249  Fortunately, 
legislative amendments to CFIUS since its inception provide significant 
measures to ensure investor confidence in foreign mergers and acquisitions 
in the United States.  FINSA in particular strengthened the CFIUS 
framework to reify an open investment policy while assuaging Congress 
that national security concerns are also addressed. 
Above all, FINSA significantly normalized the CFIUS review process 
by increasing congressional oversight vis-à-vis reporting requirements.
250
  
Moreover, the latest iteration of CFIUS regulations require the Department 
of Treasury to conduct extensive analysis of FDI in the United States that 
may implicate national security interests.
251
  These requirements “allow for 
greater transparency while maintaining the evaluation and decision-making 
process entirely within the [E]xecutive branch.”252  This added 
congressional oversight increases overall accountability, which ensures 
foreign investors that CFIUS will “be armed with a strong case in support 
of its decision and would be able to respond more persuasively to close 
congressional scrutiny.”253  Ultimately, this assurance is crucial to 
preserving confidence in the national security review framework for foreign 
investments. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the United States has always been a staunch supporter of open 
investment policies globally, national security concerns have long been 
recognized as a valid limitation on foreign mergers.  These national security 
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considerations are understandably heightened in the era of globalization, 
where transnational forces easily penetrate national borders.  Since the 
1970s, the U.S. national security review process for foreign mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers of U.S. corporations has undergone several 
transformations.  At each stage of its development, proponents of economic 
liberalism have challenged the review process as being antithetical to open 
investment policies.  Since the passage of the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007, however, the U.S. national security review 
process has featured an intricate balance in protecting U.S. national security 
while promoting national economic interests. 
However, one fear of the U.S. approach has seemingly come to 
fruition.  Perhaps in retaliation to well-documented failed foreign 
acquisition attempts in the United States due to national security concerns, 
China has established its own national security review process.  This 
Comment argues, CFIUS’s new counterpart in mainland China is not 
surprising given the projected influx of foreign investment into China and 
its booming economy.  Rather, China’s model, despite its over-broadness, is 
a natural reaction to protect its national security.  Indeed, the United States 
established its security review process for foreign mergers in the 1970s.  
Despite concerns from economists, both countries enjoy a healthy dose of 
FDI.  For China, however, it remains to be seen whether its review process 
successfully balances its national security and economic interests as well as 
its U.S. counterpart in CFIUS. 
 
